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1 INTRODUCTION
Located at the heart of the concept of contemporary constitutionalism – the 
concept that underwrites the constitutional state – is democracy. While 
conditions that define both constitutionalism and democracy are intracta-
bly controversial,1 few would deny that both strive towards assumed ideal 
conditions of political, institutional and civic arrangements suited for human 
self-actualisation. Because of this convergence democracy has come to be 
accepted as one of the critical pillars integral to the definition of constitu-
tionalism.2 Notwithstanding this fact the norms that define democracy have 
become even more of a contested territory in the age of globalisation. Accen-
tuating the contestation are attempts by the dominant ideology to link free 
market capitalism and political democracy as though they were inseparable, 
if not indistinguishable.3 In this discourse “(d)emocratisation”, argues Amin, 
“is considered the necessary and natural product of submission to the ration-
ality of the world wide market. A simple dual equation is deduced from this 
logic: capitalism = democracy, democracy = capitalism”.4 To give credence to 
1 Defining constitutionalism itself has been a subject of rich controversial discourse especially by 
African scholars, many of whom have challenged the concept that has exercised sway in the western 
liberal democracies. See for example, Shivji I G “State and Constitutionalism: A new Democratic 
Perspective”; Okoth-Ogendo H W O “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an 
African Political Paradox” both chapters in Shivji I G (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African 
Debate on Democracy (Harare, 1991). See also Amissah A “Constitutionalism and Law in Africa” in 
Ronen D (ed) Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Colorado, 1986) and Ojwang J B “Constitutional-
ism in classical terms in African Nationhood” Lesotho Law Journal 1990, Vol. 6, No. 1. 
2 De Smith S A The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London, 1964), explicitly arguing from 
a liberal democratic perspective, emphatically places democracy at the centre of constitutionalism 
(106). He contends that one would not be persuaded to proclaim the existence of constitutionalism 
where, among others, the following condtions associated with democracy do not exist: a govern-
ment genuinely accountable to an organ distinct from itself; a government freely elected on a wide 
franchise at regular intervals; political parties able to freely organise in opposition to government 
and fundamental civil liberties enforced by independent courts. 
3 Frank A G “Marketing Democracy in an undemocratic market” in Gills B, Rocamara J and Wilson R 
(eds) Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (Pluto Press, London, 1993) 
45.
4 Amin S “The Issues of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World” in Low Intensity Democracy: 
Political Power in the New World Order (fn 3) 60.
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this reductionist logic, democracy is defined in minimalist ways that steam-
roll it within the strictures of market imperatives. According to Chomsky, this 
is achieved by way of establishing democracy in one sense of the term while 
blocking it in a different sense.5
This touted sense of democracy is one that abstracts it from a living and 
inexorably unfolding human experience continually expanding and enriching 
conditions of human existence. It reifies democratic norms to a constricted 
form that projects Western liberal democracy, in the words of Fukuyama, “as 
the final form of human government”.6 Through reification, Marks observes, 
human beings cease to recognise the social world as an outcome of human 
endeavour but see it as a fixed and unchangeable object of contemplation 
rather than a domain of action. Reification, she elaborates, helps to support 
relations of domination by ensuring that those relations seem eternal, rather 
than historically specific, and necessary rather than contingent.7 Thus, in the 
context of constitutionalism, the limited norms born of liberal democracy are 
depicted as some kind of natural law which human development is destined 
never to transcend.
This article is a contribution to the debate about the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy. It seeks to interrogate the concept of 
democracy underwritten by the currently unfolding constitutional dispensa-
tions in the Third World largely driven from a neo-liberal perspective. The 
central argument is that while the post-1990s emergent constitutional state 
has by and large displaced overtly authoritarian dispensations in most of the 
developing world, the extent to which the disjuncture with authoritarianism 
has been achieved is moot. Underlying this development is the simple fact 
that neo-liberal globalisation has consciously crafted a minimalist concept of 
democracy. While this concept provides for elected government, in the same 
vein it constrains and emasculates participatory democracy, the centrality of 
social justice in the mission of the state and state sovereignty.
The discussion is divided into three parts. The first is an historical overview 
of the inception and evolution of the western concept of constitutionalism. 
The second looks into the impact of globalisation on the constitutional state 
with a particular slant on its impact on democracy. The article concludes by 
focusing on a set of proposals that may remedy the democracy deficits in the 
current concept of the constitutional state.
2  CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
In a very broad sense there are two conditions of governance that lie at the 
core of the concept of constitutionalism. The idea of control over governmen-
tal power, which assumes the form of normative limitations and institutional 
5 Chomsky N “The Struggle for Democracy in the New World Order” in Low Intensity Democracy: 
Political Power in the New World Order (fn 3) 80.
6 Fukuyama F quoted by Marks S The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and 
the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2000) 16.
7 Marks (fn 6) 21.
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diversification, is the oldest of these conditions. It is operationalised in the 
rule of law and a specific mode of organising the institutions of government 
and their interplay. This condition is at the root of what is known as limited 
government. The second aspect is the broad consensus that underwrites the 
acceptance of the institutions of government and defines their mission in 
society. Democracy, as shall be argued later, seems to be the cornerstone of 
that consensus. The article will now analyse these conditions in detail.
2.1 The liberal foundations
The institutional and normative conditions that underpin constitutionalism 
can historically be traced to Europe as both the products of the centralis-
ing force of absolutism as well as its antithesis.8 It was in the vortex of the 
struggle led by the emergent mercantile bourgeoisie against the doctrine of 
divine rights that underpinned the unlimited powers of absolute monarchs 
that a raft of political and constitutional doctrines, which in the course of 
time shaped constitutionalism, emerged. The first of these doctrines, the rule 
of law, sought to control the whims of rulers by subordinating their acts to 
the law. In its general application the rule of law ensured that citizens, the 
state and its institutions – including, of course, the kings – were all subjected 
to the supremacy of the law.9 The rule of law formed the basis of a state 
strong enough to secure order and free commercial activity, but limited in its 
competence by the restrictions of the law. Ghai correctly explains that capi-
talism’s need for predictability, calculability and security of property rights 
and transactions constituted the material basis of the rule of law.10
On the political plane the rule of law signified a landmark transformation 
of the absolutist state to a liberal constitutional state.11 This was a state born 
of the political victory of the emerging bourgeoisie against the exclusive 
political power of the monarchs. Hence Friedrich is correct in asserting that 
the bourgeoisie furnished everywhere the mainstay of political support for 
constitutionalism.12 Hall throws into sharp relief the nature of political power 
landscape instituted and underwritten by the rule of law. He says that the 
principles of market and contract became the metaphor for a new conception 
of the state: a contractual state, where power was shared between the upper 
8 Hall S “The State in Question” in G McLennan, Held D and Hall S (eds) The Idea of the Modern 
State (Open University Press, 1990) contends that, precisely because it fused and concentrated 
every element of rule within a national secular center, absolutism helped to prepare the way through 
which the constitutional ‘bourgeois’ state emerged. This developed against a backdrop of conditions 
in which, on the one hand, the consolidation of nation-states spurred the emergence of national 
economies and uniform enforcement of law and order – conditions favourable to the growth of the 
emerging mercantile bourgeoisie, while, on the other hand, the absolute monarchs’ interference with 
trade ran into conflict with the further consolidation of this emergent class (8).
9 Dicey A V Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution (London, 1960) was later credited with 
this refined and largely accepted tenet of the Rule of Law. 
10 Ghai Y “The Theory of the State in the Third World and the Problem of Constitutionalism” Con-
necticut Journal of International Law 1991, Vol. 6, 413. 
11 In the economic arena the laissez faire doctrine, expressing the right to freely enter into contract, 
became what the rule of law was on the constitutional and political planes.
12 Friedrich C J Constitutional Government and Democracy (London, 1967) 179.
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and middle ranks of society and the ruler. This contractual state, he contends, 
was guaranteed by law and formalised in a constitutional system.13
It is against this background that scholars of constitutional theory regard 
the original and indeed still more salient edifice of constitutionalism as the 
subordination of the exercise of governmental power to legal rules. De Smith 
puts it thus:
“The idea of constitutionalism involves the proposition that the exercise of governmental 
power shall be bounded by rules, rules prescribing the procedure according to which leg-
islative and executive acts are to be performed and delimiting their permissible content. 
The rules may be, at one extreme (as in the United Kingdom) mere conventional norms, 
and at the other directions, prohibitions set down in a basic constitutional instrument, 
disregard of which may be pronounced ineffectual by a court of law”.14
Central to the idea of government under the rules is the need to secure space 
for citizens’ liberties through the establishment of a legal cordon around that 
space. It is rooted in the need to keep the state at bay and, in this way, in the 
belief that the scope of arbitrariness is drastically reduced and the autonomy 
of the individual preserved by a constitutional regimen in which acts of gov-
ernment are based on pre-determined rules. “Constitutionalism,” De Smith 
further expounds, “becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb 
arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political 
power and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon which authority 
may not trespass there is significant room for the enjoyment of individual 
liberty”.15 Thus it is mainly due to the rule of law that constitutionalism is 
counterpoised to tyranny. “It is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite 
is despotic government, the government of will instead of law”, emphasises 
Nwabueze.16
We would hasten to add, however, that by itself the rule of law would prob-
ably be the proverbial pie in the sky, incapable of enforcement, were it not 
buttressed by a particular mode of organisation of the structure of govern-
ment. The principal doctrine in this regard is that of separation of powers. Its 
leading and authoritative exponent was the eighteenth century Frenchman, 
Montesquieu,17 whose exposition has since been regarded by constitutional 
theorists as one of the basic tenets of constitutionalism. Montesquieu argues 
that the powers of government are essentially of three distinct kinds, i.e. the 
executive, the legislative and the adjudicative. He opines that the concen-
tration of these powers in one person or body of persons bred tyranny. He 
argues forcefully that
“(w)hen legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single 
body of magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or 
senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative 
power and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the 
13 Hall (fn 8) 9.
14 De Smith (fn 2) 106.
15 De Smith (fn 2) 106.
16 Nwabueze B O Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (London, 1973) 1.
17 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws Cohler A, Milles B and Stone H (eds) (Cambridge, 1989). 
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power over life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge 
would be the legislator. If it were joined to the executive power, the judge 
could have the force of an oppressor”.18
From these premises Montesquieu contended that executive, adjudicative 
and legislative powers should vest in separate organs of government as a 
sure way of securing the liberties of citizens, thus vicariously bequeathing 
the doctrine its name derived from this postulate in the organisation of state 
power.
But Montesquieu’s articulation of separation of powers is not without prob-
lems. It implies the fragmentation of state and government, a fact that betrays 
a simplistic grasp of fairly complex and dynamic interactions among the three 
arms of government. Vile rightly says that, standing alone as a theory of gov-
ernment, separation of powers has uniformly failed to provide an adequate 
basis for an effective and stable political system. He maintains that it is on 
that account that it has had to be combined with other political ideas, such 
as mixed government and checks and balances, to form the complex consti-
tutional theories that anchor the modern western political system.19 Together, 
these concepts allow for a degree of autonomy of organs of government while 
also permitting a significant measure of overlap as well as the competence 
of one to intervene in the sphere of others under defined conditions. Such a 
complex interplay ensures the cohesion of the political system.
Needless to emphasise, whatever conceptual deficiencies separation of pow-
ers betrays, it emerged historically as part and parcel of an array of political 
devices in the struggle to weaken the authority of absolutist monarchs. It was 
a theory that justified the removal from the monarchs’ immediate and direct 
remits some of their erstwhile powers – notably legislative and judicial pow-
ers. Thus, in sharp departure from theories celebrating the omnipotence and 
indivisibility of power, Vile argues, defenders of liberty stressed the division 
of power.20 From another tangent, however, Gramsci contends for a different 
understanding of separation of powers, positing that, in fact, all three pow-
ers are organs of the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but in different 
degrees. Parliament (the legislative organ), he argues, is more closely linked 
with civil society, while the judiciary, seemingly located between the execu-
tive arm and parliament, represents both the continuity and predominance 
of written law.21
What is beyond controversy, however, is that along with those other politi-
cal ideas and devices – such as the rule of law, checks and balances and an 
independent judiciary – the doctrine historically formed part of institutional 
arrangements constraining the power of government and thus created a legal, 
political and social environment commensurate to conditions of constitution-
alism.
18 Montesquieu (fn 17) 157. 
19 Vile M J C Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, 1967) 2.
20 Vile (fn 19) 4.
21 Gramsci A in Hoore Q and Smith G N (eds) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(London, 1971) 246. 
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Judicial independence is a doctrine that evolved logically and organi-
cally from separation of powers as the latter envisaged different spheres of 
operation for each of the three principal arms of government. “The general 
principle of the independence of the judiciary”, writes Friedrich, “has come to 
be universally accepted as a basic tenet of constitutionalism and government 
according to law”.22 Judicial independence, Heuston says, implies freedom of 
the courts of law from interference by the executive or the legislature in the 
exercise of the judicial function, but does not mean that the judge is entitled 
to act in an arbitrary manner.23 Nwabueze expounds that “(i)t means inde-
pendence from political influence, whether exerted by the political organs 
of government or by the public or brought in by judges themselves through 
involvement in politics”.24
Most critically, however, it can also be contended that judicial independ-
ence serves an important ideological function that sustains the political 
and social order.25 The apparent autonomy of the courts from the executive 
and the legislature reinforces the perception that they are disinterested and 
impartial arbiters of rights. The ideological function served by the perception 
that the courts of law are independent helps to promote the claim, real or 
fictional, that legal rules are applied fairly and impartially in the Weberian 
formal-rational sense.
Thus, among them, the doctrines explored above laid the foundation of 
limited government that lies at the heart of the liberal constitutional state. 
Collectively they reflected a little disguised antipathy to state power. It is an 
antipathy well articulated by Sher, who contends that the idea that the sheer 
magnitude of the state’s power is a threat to its citizens, and that this threat 
must somehow be tamed, has long been a prominent theme of the liberal 
thought.26
2.2 The democratic foundations
From the tangent of citizens’ liberties, limited government was, without 
doubt, a progressive development. It provided space for those who could 
thrive unaided by government if only the law could provide them with protec-
tion from government and other citizens. It can, however, be argued that 
this constitutional model did not only limit the writ of government, but also 
significantly limited its legitimacy.27 Thus the legitimacy deficit of the liberal 
constitutional state was a pernicious matter of which resolution had to be 
found in two interrelated processes. These two aspects can be distinguished 
22 Friedrich (fn 12) 179.
23 Heuston R F V Essays in Constitutional Law (London 1964) 52-53.
24 Nwabueze B O Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (London, 1977) 280.
25 This is in the sense that courts are portrayed as the individual citizen’s ultimate sanctuary of redress 
against oppressive encroachments on his rights by the organs of the state or by other citizens.
26 Sher R “Rights, Neutrality and the Oppressive Power of the State” in Law and Philosophy: An Inter-
national Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy May 1975, Vol. 14, No 2, 185.
27 Its narrow social (class) base and mission was otherwise its cardinal Achilles heel, countermanding 
its acceptance by the broader society.
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as the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy, to whose brief 
exploration we now turn.
(1) Procedural democracy
Participation by the citizenry in the political process in the liberal state was 
historically a right circumscribed on all sides by a plethora of exclusions. It 
was a state in which the right to elect rulers was confined to the privileged few 
defined by class, race and sex.28 Hall highlights the fact that almost the entire 
landscape of civil and political rights nowadays taken for granted was beyond 
the reach of the majority, who could neither assemble as they chose, ‘publish 
and be damned’, join a trade union, hold many posts if they were Dissenters, 
vote or dispose of property if they were women.29
The constitutionalisation of a universal franchise was added only when 
the working class that had been produced by the capitalist market society 
had become strong enough to demand that it should have some weight in 
the competitive process.30 As an historic development universal suffrage in 
the West became a norm well into the twentieth century – for example, only 
being constitutionally secured in Britain with the enactment of the Represen-
tation of the People Acts of 1918 and 1928.31
Thus it would be correct to contend that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
democracy became a reality not as an organic by-product of the liberal con-
stitutional state but as its antithesis.32 Significantly, the extension of civil and 
political rights to hitherto marginalised groups broadened political consensus 
or what some scholars term procedural consensus. Forman observes that “(e)
ver since the successive extensions of the franchise in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, this kind of consensus has been signified by wide-
spread agreement upon the desirability of using parliamentary channels for 
the implementation of political change”.33 Thus procedural consensus but-
tressed constitutionalism to the extent that its point of departure was further 
to legitimise the existing institutions and the entrenchment of the so-called 
rules of the game, spelling out how political power play should be conducted. 
It seems plausible, therefore, to argue that it laid the basis for a relatively 
settled political culture and stability associated with Western democracies 
and constitutionalism.
28 Marks (fn 6) 30. 
29 Hall (fn 8) 10.
30 MacPherson C B The Real World of Democracy, (Oxford, 1966) 35.
31 Turpin C British Government and the Constitution, (London, 1985) 19. The first of the Acts extended 
suffrage to all men and women of over thirty years while the second extended it to women of over 
twenty-one.
32 It seems that in more or less the same way that the rule of law, separation of powers and all the other 
constitutional political devices had evolved to constrain absolutism and harmonise government with 
the interests of the bourgeoisie, democracy became a vehicle for the lower classes to influence the 
liberal state.
33 Forman F N British Politics (London, 1979) 7.
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(2) Social-democratic orientation
And yet it should be clear that, in itself, procedural democracy was not 
significant in transforming the basic feature of the constituted state which, 
as Hall correctly observes, it only modified by deepening its popular base 
and content.34 When the transformation of the basic characteristic of the 
state did happen, it was founded on a consensus that developed around an 
enlarged writ for government to intervene in the social and economic spheres 
influenced largely by the socially marginalised classes. The dominant classes 
supported this newly-found role for the state in the name of greater ‘national 
efficiency’, while the working classes, the poor and unemployed supported it 
because they believed that only through the state would reforms be imposed 
on industrial capitalism in order to improve their living conditions, provide 
greater economic equality and social justice.35 Writing specifically of Great 
Britain, Forman contends that consensus in the economic and social sphere 
was forged around the goals contained in the 1942 Beveridge Report and the 
Keynesian White Papers of 1944. The former, he says, “foreshadowed the 
principal elements of the postwar Welfare State”, while the latter “established 
the postwar objective of full employment”.36 It was thus the enlarged govern-
ment writ that gave birth to a panoply of socio-economic rights, or what came 
to be known as second-generation rights, anchored around the emergent 
welfare state or social democracy.
It can be seen from this account that, from a constitutional theory per-
spective, a critical departure from the nineteenth century model of state had 
thus been established. In this new dispensation the discretionary powers of 
the government, albeit within defined legal parameters, were reincarnated. 
General rules were no longer concerned with the ousting of government 
involvement in economic and social management but with ousting arbitrari-
ness when government does so. Thus it now became possible to take tentative 
practical steps to bridge the gap between formal justice as proclaimed by the 
notion that all are equal before the law, on the one hand, and substantive jus-
tice achieved through the competence of the state to intervene in the social 
and economic spheres and direct material resources and services to areas of 
social need, on the other.
But for exponents and adherents of classical liberalism, such as Hayek,37 
the threshold had been ominously traversed. They saw the new state as a 
threat to individual liberties and the Rule of Law – the latter being conceived 
merely in terms of formal (and certainly not substantive) justice. Hayek, for 
example, vigorously criticised this newly crafted feature of the constitutional 
state, arguing that
“(a) necessary, and only apparently paradoxical, result of this is that formal equality 
before the law is in conflict, and in fact incompatible, with any activity of the government 
deliberately aiming at the material or substantive equality of different people, and that 
34 Hall (fn 8) 10-11.
35 Hall (fn 8) 11.
36 Forman (fn 33) 5.
37 Hayek F A The Road to Serfdom (London, 1949).
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any policy directly aiming at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the 
destruction of the Rule of Law”.38
Central to Hayek’s thesis was the argument that the exercise of discretion-
ary powers by governmental institutions necessarily involved discriminating 
between individuals on the basis of the authorities’ ad hoc notions of what is 
morally right or otherwise. More importantly, Hayek felt that the appropria-
tion of the right of choice by governmental institutions necessarily implied 
that the individual herself or himself lost the liberty to make the choice.
Despite detractions such as these, it is true that for about forty years govern-
ments’ right to intervene, manage and re-order socio-economic affairs within 
the law and for public good was a key feature of how the constitutional state 
was conceived. Deducing from this newly established state competence Ghai 
concludes that “(a)n essential basis of contemporary western constitutional-
ism is a social compact between capital and labour under which the market 
system is accepted within the context of a welfare state, designed to mitigate 
the worst social consequences of the market and to ensure a reasonable 
standard”.39
3  THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD UNDER GLOBALISATION: IS DEMOCRACY IN 
RETREAT?
3.1 Globalisation problematised
A necessary prelude to the discussion of the impact of globalisation on the 
practice of the constitutional state and, in particular, on its shaping of how 
democracy is institutionalised, lies in how globalisation is problematised and 
understood. Far too often commentators project ‘globalisation’ as if it were 
one and the same thing as ‘internationalisation’. For example, in their other-
wise insightful contribution Mhone and Edigheji remark that
“(t)he world has witnessed significant changes in the last three decades – generally termed 
globalisation. By this we mean the intensification and greater integration of economic, socio-
cultural and political relations and activities across regions and continents”.40
It is contended, however, that the processes defined by these scholars certainly 
predate globalisation. Per se these developments define internationalisation, 
although globalisation may have given them accelerated impetus in recent 
years. How then would we define globalisation?
A definition of ‘globalisation’ that sheds light rather than cast the phenom-
enon in an obscurantist cloak is one invoked by Saul, who opines that it is a 
form of internationalisation in which human civilisation is reformed from the 
perspective, not of human leadership, but of the innate force of economics at 
work in the marketplace.41 He contends that while globalisation is presented 
38 Hayek (fn 37) 59. 
39 Ghai (fn 10) 452. 
40 Mhone G and Edigheji O “Economic liberalisation, governance and development in Southern Africa 
in the era of globalisation” in Landsberg C and Mackay S (eds) Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The 
Search for Democratic Governance (Cape Town, 2004) 138 (emphasis added). 
41 Saul J R The Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World (London, 2005) 19.
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as a value-free and inevitable force of modernisation, in fact it is infected 
from the beginning by a political tendency known as neo-liberalism or eco-
nomic rationalism.42 From this tangent, it can therefore be contended that 
‘globalisation’ is an ideological project serving to shape global economic and 
political systems in a manner congruent to the specific agenda of corporate 
capitalism. It seems to have steadily established its sway in the aftermath 
of what Hobsbawm terms the “return among politicians and ideologists to 
an ultra-radical laissez-faire critique of the state which holds that the role of 
the state must be diminished at all costs”.43 Its ideological and philosophical 
inspiration draws heavily from erstwhile expositions such as that of Hayek, 
discussed earlier.44
This section of the article will thus interrogate and highlight how this ideo-
logical project is predicated on a kind of liberalisation modelled to ensure 
that a dominant, if not universal, character of the emergent constitutional 
state is consciously crafted around the notion of limited democracy. In this 
sense, limited democracy implies not so much the generally accepted idea 
that, in a functioning democracy, minority will checks and tempers majority 
will. On the contrary, the concept here refers to the constitutionalisation of 
patterns of state practices and processes intended to disconnect, or having 
the effect of disconnecting, citizens as the locus of imperium, and of emascu-
lating in extreme situations, or constraining or limiting in others, the essence 
of popular will.45 Three permutations of this model of the constitutional state 
will now be discussed.
3.2 Markets liberalisation and democratic sovereignty
Situating globalisation within the neo-liberal framework of the Washington 
Consensus, Mhone and Edigheji argue that the thrust of the framework is to 
free global markets from state control through deregulation, the privatisation 
and commercialisation of public enterprises, the institutionalisation of flexible 
labour markets and the creation of a minimalist state achieved through the 
reduction of its size and role in society. They highlight particularly how this 
development has considerably shifted power away from the political domain 
and democratic control to global companies.46 Driving the totality of all these 
measures is the ideology of economic and political liberalisation pushed, at 
one level, mainly by international pressures led by the World Bank (WB) and 
42 Saul (fn 41) 32. Castells M in Muller J, Cloete N and Badat S (eds) “The new global economy” in 
Challenges of globalisation (Cape Town, 2001) agrees that globalisation is, among others, a code 
word for the emerging world system and at the same time the banner to rally the determined march 
of global corporate capitalism (3) .
43 Hobsbawm E Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism (Great Britain, 2007) 103.
44 Saul (fn 41) 93. 
45 Matlosa K “Caught between transition and democratic consolidation: Dilemmas of political change 
in Southern Africa” in Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The Search for Democratic Governance, (fn 
40) poses the question whether the transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Africa were any-
thing more than a simple political liberalisation because of their ambivalence towards participatory 
democracy. He calls the emergent political systems ‘formal democracy’ in contrast with what he 
refers to as ‘substantive democracy’ (18).
46 Mhone and Edigheji (fn, 40) 138. 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on state authorities as a condition 
for aid and continued engagement, and at another by the internal struggles 
of organisations of civil society which saw democratisation of the state as 
the best way of cutting their losses in the economy resulting from structural 
adjustments imposed by the former.47
Significant, albeit contradictory, political and constitutional consequences 
arise directly from liberalisation. Firstly, political liberalisation of the state 
helps to dismantle the authoritarian state and open political space for 
tentative democratisation – which is undoubtedly a positive constitutional 
development. But then, and more significantly, economic liberalisation is 
part and parcel of an international process of freeing global capitalism and 
the markets from the legal purview of the political state. Thus, while it is 
trite that state political institutions’ external expression of sovereignty and 
their domestic competence respectively can only be legally limited by the 
operation of norms of international law and clearly defined constitutional 
rules and other domestic laws,48 this conception of the constitutional state 
is challenged by the emergence of global markets operating as extra-jurid-
ical, extra-jurisdictional or supra-national phenomena anchored around 
the ideology and practice of globalisation. Globalisation has ensured that, 
notwithstanding their sway in national economies over domestic policy and 
state behaviour, global markets are beyond the reach of either municipal or 
international law. By so doing some kind of “markets sovereignty” – or, in the 
words of former South African President Thabo Mbeki, “the notion of ‘the 
market’ as the modern god, a supernatural phenomenon to whose dictates 
everything human must bow in a spirit of powerlessness”49 – is unleashed. 
Such a situation holds grave implications for national constitutional systems 
and is a challenge to the integrity of the constitutional state. It renders the 
constitutional state a repository of political sovereignty it cannot exercise in 
full measure.
This reality indicts democratic rule directly. Democracy is inexorably 
predicated on popular sovereignty, by which is meant that national politi-
cal authorities are not only formally mandated to make key decisions but 
are also accountable to the citizenry for them. But, as Hobsbawm correctly 
contends, the idea of market sovereignty is not a complement of democracy 
but an alternative to it – and, indeed, to politics – since it denies the need for 
political decisions which are substituted by the pursuit of individual choices 
offered by the markets. In this way the concept ‘citizens’, which is at the 
heart of politics, is substituted by that of ‘consumers’, which is at the heart 
of markets.50 Arguing from the same perspective, Saul observes that in the 
47 Bangura Y “Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse” in Gibbon P, 
Bangura Y and Ofstad A (eds) Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: Politics of Reform in 
Africa (Uppsala, 1992) 44-48.
48 The latter understanding lies at the heart of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy that sets out 
the parameters of the powers of state institutions.
49 Mbeki T “Prologue” in Makgoba M W (ed) African Renaissance: The New Struggle (Mafube Publish-
ing (Pty) Ltd, Cape Town, 1999) xviii.
50 Hobsbawm (fn 43) 104.
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world dominated by international corporate capitalism, the most important 
decisions – those related to the economy – are beyond the control of national 
power holders.51 Frank agrees that the global economy precludes the exer-
cise of real national sovereignty and the implementation of truly democratic 
decisions by the people. The backdrop to this, Frank observes, is the severe 
structural limitation to democratic participation by the people in the world 
economy which ensures that they cannot and do not have control over it. 
This leaves effective democratic control of state political institutions limited 
to the formulation of relatively unimportant domestic political policy, while 
the most important decisions are made outside the range of democracy.52
It is therefore axiomatic that the loss of sovereign authority by national 
political institutions to global markets is a significant departure from the con-
stitutional state as hitherto known. This development imports a distortion 
to one of the more significant principles underlying the constitutional state 
– the principle of democratic accountability. In this landscape the political 
and legal accountability of state institutions, the very essence of democratic 
agency, and the power reposing in international corporate capitalism and 
exercised within the nation state, are at tension. This is so even as global 
markets are themselves not accountable in any way for their actions. The 
consequence is that the sovereign territorial state, which is the essential 
framework of democratic, or any, politics, is today weaker than before53.
3.3 Is democracy no more than frequent elections?
Also intriguing in the emergent constitutional state configured by the ethos 
of globalisation is its predication on minimalist conditions of democracy. To 
be sure, most new constitutions make an effort to enshrine most, if not all, of 
the formalities of constitutional democracy such as bills of rights, recognition 
of the right of dissention, plural politics, periodic elections, etc. Poignantly, 
however, the model is designed to limit citizens’ participation and role in 
government to the election of leaders who, alone and to the exclusion of the 
citizenry, must be seized with the business of decision-making and governing. 
Periodic elections, contends Shivji, “presumably, constitutes the participa-
tion of citizens in the running of the government as well as the government’s 
accountability to them”.54 They thus constitute the final act of citizens’ par-
ticipation in governance and define the limits of their influence on the mission 
and behaviour of the state and its functionaries. Ironically, this minimalist 
conception in the participation of the citizenry is the antithesis of the mass 
mobilisation of 1970s and 80s that drove out the dictators in the developing 
world who had privatised public space and politics.
The point, however, is that the limited notion of democracy – a notion 
that reduces democracy narrowly to the periodic election of rulers – is not 
accidental at all. It underscores a reconceptualised form of a constitutional 
51 Saul (fn 41) 19. 
52 Frank (fn 3) 49. 
53 Hobsbawm (fn 43) 104-105.
54 Shivji (fn 1) 36.
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state consciously crafted to be weak in relation to the sway of global markets, 
while also sufficiently barricaded against the day-to-day influence of ordi-
nary citizens and civil society. This is a state in which citizens’ control over 
elected officials is removed while accountability, transparency and public 
participation are undermined.55 Paraphrasing Schumpeter, this model’s lead-
ing exponent, Marks articulates the underlying philosophy thus:
“It follows that a realistic account of democratic politics must put aside romantic notions 
about citizenship and popular sovereignty, emancipation and social justice, and place at 
its centre the selection of representatives and the competitive struggle for office. While 
every citizen must have the right to take part in electoral processes, Schumpeter remarks 
that one feature of his account is that it gives proper recognition to ‘the vital fact of 
leadership’”.56
In the age of globalisation, therefore, the ritual of periodic elections char-
acterises not the means to the end in the involvement of the citizens in the 
democratic process, nor one of the several manifestations of democratic par-
ticipation: it is supposedly the end itself.
At least one significant development bearing directly on constitutionalism 
flows logically from this conception of democracy. Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 
point out that, on the one hand, this ‘cosmetic’ democratisation brings some 
limited positive change in civil and human rights culture and widens the legal 
space in which popular mobilisation for change can take place.57 But such 
popular mobilisation may be perceived by state power-holders as a challenge 
to their authority and an illegitimate interference with what they conceive 
as their exclusive prerogative to govern. In many Third World countries this 
contradiction belies the weakness of the political system and forces the state 
to resolve it through the re-institution of repressive practices, amounting to 
what Okoth-Ogendo calls the shrinking of the political arena58 that was the 
hallmark of erstwhile authoritarian regimes. In consequence, “after an initial 
loosening of political repression, repressive measures are re-introduced”.59 It 
is thus fair to conclude that the minimalist conception of democracy does not 
in the long term enhance democratic constitutionalism but inexorably leads 
to sublime authoritarianism.
3.4 Social justice abandoned
The ethos of globalisation is undoubtedly responsible in a major respect for the 
vitiation of the principle that the exercise of state power must seek to advance 
the ends of society, which Okoth-Ogendo terms the essence of constitution-
alism.60 At the heart of the conundrum is a division of labour entrenched 
by the Washington Consensus whereby, on the one hand, markets are the 
principal drivers of social and economic development while the state, on the 
other, is consigned by and large to merely ensuring a conducive environ-
55 Mhone and Edigheji (fn , 40) 139.
56 Marks (fn 6) 50 – 51.
57 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (fn 3) 21.
58 Okoth-Ogendo (fn 1) 15-16 discusses the features of this phenomenon. 
59 Marks (fn 6) 58.
60 Okoth-Ogendo (fn 1) 20. 
14
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT
ment. A prognosis of development based on this division of labour overlooks 
the fact that markets are not competent to ensure social justice.61 The state’s 
marginalisation in socio-economic development thus forms the background 
of a socio-economic system in most Third World countries characterised by 
permanent, institutionalised high employment and slow growth,62 normalisa-
tion of poverty63 and institutionalised job insecurity.64
These features challenge the concept of constitutionalism in fundamental 
ways. Firstly, the division of labour between the markets and the state, impos-
ing a highly circumscribed mandate on the latter, is inimical to a vibrant 
democracy. Invariably it results in the policies of political parties competing 
for office having very little to distinguish them. In consequence, the electorate 
is effectively deprived of an important right – the right to a meaningful choice 
between programmes addressing vital political and socio-economic issues. 
Elections in this context tend to be a mere formality, perhaps limited to a 
choice of personalities and styles. Secondly, the state’s primary responsibility 
of advancing social justice and striving for the achievement of substantive 
equality in society is dramatically weakened, changing in the process the 
content of the social contract between citizens and governments.65 It cannot 
be overemphasised that such a social contract is both the bedrock of societal 
consensus and the legitimacy of the constitutional state. Thus the dissolution 
of the contract in this manner strikes at the very heart of the essence of the 
constitutional state as it has come to be understood.
4  RE-LOCATING DEMOCRACY AT THE HEART OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
The characteristics outlined above clearly indicate the parlous state of democ-
racy in the age of globalisation. Writing in a different context, Hutchison 
poses rhetorically a question equally pertinent here:
“The more pressing conundrum, therefore, is that, if democratic procedures do not guar-
antee democratic outcomes and democratic outcomes need not result from democratic 
procedures, how can we best organise constitutional arrangements so that democracy as 
a whole is more than less likely to prevail?”66
It is indeed true that the democracy deficits identified above are a by-product 
of a particular form of constitutional state. Thus the constitutional land-
scape must be re-arranged to provide a framework that would ensure that 
“democratic politics is less a matter of forms and events than an affair of rela-
tionships and processes, an open-ended and continually re-contextualised 
agenda of enhancing control by citizens of decision-making which affects 
them and overcoming disparities in the distribution of citizenship rights and 
61 Mhone and Edigheji (fn 40) 139.
62 Saul (fn 41) 123.
63 Saul (fn 41) 131.
64 Saul (fn 41) 148.
65 Edigheji O quoted in Mhone and Edigheji (fn 40) 139.
66 Hutchison A C “Judges and politics: an essay from Canada” in Legal Studies: The Journal of the 
Society of Legal Scholar Vol, 24, Issues 1 and 2, March 2004, 284.
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opportunities”.67 This is a concept of democracy clearly at variance with that 
advocated by the neo-liberal thought. A few things can be done to advance in 
this direction, central to which must be the review of the entire constitutional 
landscape to bring about proper balance between the executive and other 
organs of the state and civil society.
Firstly, while the principal form of modern governance draws on the con-
cept of representative government, a simultaneous embedding of cooperative 
governance would establish and strengthen an evolving, continuous and 
dynamic relationship between the citizens and governance and give democ-
racy a much needed new lease of life. Cooperative governance – implying 
parallel direct citizens’ participation in government along with representative 
government – holds the potential to enrich the democratic project. A number 
of constitutions around the world already allow citizens, for example, to give 
the final stamp of approval by way of referenda to designated or controversial 
critical public issues.
In the developing world, the South African constitution provides interest-
ing, albeit tentative, mechanisms of mandatory community or interest groups 
consultations on matters directly affecting them. Two recent Constitutional 
Court decisions, in which the court repudiated Acts passed by Parliament 
on the grounds that constitutionally sanctioned consultations with relevant 
communities and interest groups had been flouted, amply highlight the 
significance of such provisions thus underscoring elements of cooperative 
governance.68 But the limits of the South African constitutional arrangements 
were exposed by the majority judgment in Merafong Demarcation Forum 
and 10 Others v The President of the Republic South Africa and 15 Others.69 
While the Court extolled the importance of the participative mechanisms in 
strengthening the legitimacy of legislation and as a significant counterweight 
to influence-peddling and secret lobbying, it nonetheless put a damper on 
legal enforceability of the wishes of the public expressed in that process if 
they are in conflict with policies of government. It ruled:
“There is no authority for the proposition that the views expressed by the public are 
binding on the legislature if they are in direct conflict with the policies of Government. 
Government certainly can be expected to be responsive to the needs and wishes of 
minorities or interest groups, but our constitutional system of government would not be 
able to function if the legislature were bound by these views. The public participation in 
the legislative process, which the Constitution envisages, is supposed to supplement and 
enhance the democratic nature of general elections and majority rule, not to conflict with or 
even overrule or veto them”.70
While in its generality the fundamental constitutional principle expressed by 
the Court may be correct, it nonetheless betrays the need creatively to develop 
67 Marks (fn 6) 109-110.
68 See Matatiele Municipality and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2006 
(5) BCLR 622 (CC) and Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and 11 
Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC).
69 Unreported Case CCT 41/07; discussed elsewhere in this issue: see Linda Nyati “Public Participa-
tion: What has the Constitutional Court given the public?” (below).
70 Fn 69, at para 50 (emphasis added).
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principles that would ensure that participatory democracy is more than a 
cynical exercise of going through the motions to legitimise decisions already 
taken by organs of government. The answer seems to lie in the concept of 
self-rule or self-determination advocated by lateral constitutional theorists.71 
Obviously there is scope for amplifying multiple forms of direct participation 
by the citizenry to expand and enrich the democratic project.
Secondly, the traditional distinction between civil and political rights on the 
one hand, and socio-economic rights on the other, calls for vigorous interroga-
tion. While the level of economic development in some countries may justify 
the distinction, power should be vested in oversight institutions such as state 
human rights organisations to scrutinise and evaluate, on an on-going basis, 
the state’s capacity to deliver on socio-economic rights. On the one hand their 
reports could serve before legislative bodies to enable the latter to critique 
governments’ management of the public purse and provide necessary checks 
in an area long abandoned as the exclusive preserve of the executive. On 
the other, those organisations could use the reports in litigation to appear as 
“friends of the court” in matters where the state claims incapacity to assist 
particularly indigent litigants. Reports of this nature would undoubtedly also 
be critical assets to civil society lobby groups to influence the distribution of 
resources.
Thirdly, given the inescapable fact that the current norms run counter to 
the realisation, not to mention the optimisation, of public good, courts of law 
cannot afford a business-as-usual jurisprudential posture. They should be 
more activist, particularly in matters concerning social justice. In this regard 
we are persuaded by Hutchison, who makes a salient point: while it is impor-
tant to recognise that there are constitutional boundaries to judicial action, 
those boundaries are not gratuitously handed to the courts but are developed 
and negotiated in the field of practice by the courts themselves. From that 
tangent he argues that, once the principle of democracy is accepted to have 
a substantive as well as a formal dimension, judicial activism must also be 
viewed in its substantive and formal justifications. Thus Hutchison argues for 
judicial activism, contending that the work of the courts must be evaluated 
not in terms of their capacity for ostensible objectivity or impartiality but in 
terms of their choices and the contribution that their decisions make to the 
advancement of substantive democracy.72
Finally, the parliamentary system of government adopted by many devel-
oping countries and historically borrowed from Westminster is plainly weak 
in affording an effective countervailing role to the executive and in ensuring 
that the latter’s role remains driven at all times by the interests of the elector-
ate. Explaining the structural defect underlining the parliamentary system, 
Webber contends that “(i)n parliamentary systems, the executive is nested 
entirely within the legislature, so that it is (at least in theory) the creature of 
71 The concept of self-governance or self-determination to enhance democracy at local level is advo-
cated by Shivji (fn 1) 42-44. See also Marks (fn 6) 59. 
72 Hutchison (fn 66) 283 – 284.
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the legislature. Indeed, the party system has further reshaped the relationship 
so that it is now one of intense symbiosis, in which the legislative majority sees 
its fate as tied to the executive’s and the latter consequently wields consider-
able influence over the former”.73 Delinking the executive from the legislature 
is therefore imperative if the latter is to be freed from the clutches of the 
former and to allow it to reclaim its full oversight potential over the executive. 
At least in theory, models of the presidential system go some way towards 
breaking the politically imperative grovelling support of the parliamentary 
majority to the executive. Properly exercising its functions, a legislature freed 
from the domination of the executive and steadfastly committed to citizens’ 
aspirations can be a useful counterweight and a steadying hand to an execu-
tive weakened by the role of supra-national interests such as global markets 
– and, thus, of reinforcing political sovereignty and meaningful democracy in 
a constitutional state.
5 CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to situate the emergence and evolution of the con-
stitutional state in an historical context. In the first section an effort is made 
to trace the trajectory of the constitutional state from its inception in Europe 
and to map out the various pillars that shaped it and the social conditions 
that gave rise to those pillars. A recurrent theme in all these developments 
is the fact that the various forms the constitutional state assumed at differ-
ent times were clearly linked with political and social struggles. In its early 
phase the overarching challenge was to create conditions for liberty ushered 
in through a complex system characterised, inter alia, by division of powers, 
subjection of rulers to the law and the sharing of powers between rulers and 
upper classes. The emergent capitalist class was undoubtedly the purveyor 
of the struggles that shaped this phase, constitutionalising a social contract 
based on the notion of limited government, introducing a legislative body 
separate from the executive, an independent judiciary and representative 
government.
On the other hand it is apparent from this historical overview that, while 
democracy arose from within the vortex of conditions created by capitalist 
development, it impacted differently on, and necessitated the reconceptuali-
sation of, the constitutional state. Contrary to seeing the state as an enemy 
to be put at bay, the social classes that shaped the state’s democratisation 
ensured that it became a useful countervailing force to the dominance of 
capital. An enlarged writ conferred on government to mediate adverse effects 
of capital and to provide public goods established for the first time a concrete 
link between formal equality and substantive justice, thus giving the rule of 
law a new constitutional meaning.
The section discussing the impact of globalisation highlights not only a 
myriad of distortions, but also restrictions wrought by neo-liberal thought 
73 Webber J “Supreme Courts, independence and democratic agency” in Legal Studies: The Journal of 
the Society of Legal Scholar March 2004, Vol. 24 No 1 and 2, 60.
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on the further development of the constitutional state. It is apparent that 
the over-emphasis on forms and rituals, to the exclusion of a dynamic and 
on-going relationship between governance and active citizens’ participation, 
has by-and-large expunged the essence of democratic politics and distorted 
the mission of the state away from social justice and public good. Thus, while 
democracy is upheld in forms and rituals, it is otherwise highly circumscribed 
and limited in practice as a function of a calculated concept intended to 
render it so. In no time a constitutional state anchored in such limitations 
forgoes its legitimacy; often forcing it to be defensive and to seek sanctuary in 
authoritarian means. The proposals advocated in the penultimate section of 
this article may go some distance towards overcoming and dislodging these 
systemic and structural strictures and to rehabilitate democracy and public 
good at the heart of the conceptualisation and practice of the constitutional 
state.
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